. 22 The MLA was not entirely venerable. One of its executive members was also an FBI informant. He advised the FBI that Bradley, whom he had known for over twenty years, was "leftist" in his views but "very well regarded as a teacher and as a research man". constituted House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), 24 the JAFRC was ordered to produce all its "books, ledger sheets, bank statements, documents and records" that would reveal both the names and addresses of all contributors to its funds, as well as the names and addresses of all recipients of such funds for 1944 and 1945. 25 One by one, the entire seventeen-member board of the JAFRC appeared before HUAC and one by one each refused to surrender the required records. But before examining the consequences of this action, we should consider briefly the JAFRC itself.
The Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee was formed in early 1942. It was composed primarily of veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade who had fought in the Spanish civil war. 26 At the end of that conflict a mass exodus of over 500,000 Spanish Republicans refugees spilled into southern France. Most congregated in refugee camps and, from 1940, were forced into concentration camps during the German occupation. Some remained in Franco"s Spain, evading imprisonment or death. 27 Others escaped to Spanish-speaking countries such as Cuba and the Dominican Republic. It was these refugees whose plight was the raison d'être of the JAFRC. It sent thousands of dollars and 24 The new HUAC was not merely a reincarnation or reactivation of the Dies Committee; it was, uniquely, a permanent committee. It was approved by the House by 207 votes to 186 with 40 (including Lyndon B. Johnson) abstaining. As the mover, John E. Rankin, rejoiced: "I caught "em flat-footed and flat-headed". Cited in Walter Goodman, The Committee, The first JAFRC member to travel to Washington and confront the Committee was its administrative secretary, Helen R. Bryan. She did not travel alone: a delegation of more than 200 supporters accompanied her on the overnight train from New York. When she was inside HUAC"s chambers on 23 and 24 January 1946, they were lobbying Congressmen. Bryan, a Quaker, was a highly courageous woman. She was variously described as "saintly"; imbued with "integrity", "loyalty" and a "high-minded sensitivity"; and devoted to a "lifetime service to humanity". 32 nominal custodian of the records she willingly assumed full responsibility for the Board"s refusal to surrender them. Presumably this tactic sought to insulate the rest of the Board from prosecution.
According to Fast, "if we had had any premonition that imprisonment would result from this, not one of us would have allowed Helen Bryan to take the fall". 33 However, she took "a course of action that involved risk to herself rather than risk to others". 34 The price she paid was a year in jail. 
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colleague. 45 His own professional organisation, the MLA, of which he was an office-bearer, took a "wait-and-see" attitude. 46 So, too, did the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), of which he was a member. 47 Even the chairman of the NYU chapter of the AAUP acknowledged that "I should have made a bigger fuss". 48 The NYU administration, however, was less reticent. Two days after the Executive Board members of the JAFRC were convicted on 28 June 1947 (but before they were sentenced), the Dean of Washington Square College of Arts and Science, Thomas C. Pollock, removed Bradley from the position of Chair of the German Department. Pollock himself became
Acting Chair with the assistance of an advisory committee. This decision was conveyed to members of the German Department, who did not react, and to the University Council, which did. On 27
October, on the motion of the Chancellor, Harry Woodburn Chase, it approved and confirmed Dean
Pollock"s action. 49 There was, however, a rally organised by the quickly-formed "Students It also noted, in even more wooden language, that refusal by the administration to permit Bradley to speak at this meeting "rekindled radical remonstrance".
Beyond the student body at NYU -which, rather than the faculty, 58 was in the vanguard of the protest movement -opposition to Bradley"s suspension escalated throughout 1948. A wide range of individuals (from lawyers to housewives) and organisations (from the Civil Rights Congress to the Carmel Country Club) wrote to the University"s senior administrators; overwhelmingly they were protest letters. 59 Typical was the sentiment expressed in one hand-written letter: "I was stunned to hear of the dismissal of Dr. Lyman Bradley…you should instead commend Dr. Bradley for his brave stand and fine American attitude. He"s a real American, not un-American Committee brand, but the Jeffersonian kind! Shame on you!" 60 As with most letters, this received no reply. Voorhis claimed they emanated from "the lunatic fringe". 61 Pollock specifically recommended that the Chancellor not respond to correspondence from the Bureau on Academic Freedom because of its "general impudence"; it stated, inter alia, that NYU had "run for cover before this Committee [HUAC]".
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The extent to which the administration of NYU had "run for cover" is difficult to determine with any precision. Being a private university NYU was a relatively autonomous institution. Unlike public colleges, it was not beholden unto the Board of Education or Section 903 of the New York City Charter, which enabled the summary dismissal of any public employee who refused to answer self-incriminating questions. Nor was NYU was under any obligation to abide by HUAC"s contempt With the petition to the Supreme Court for a rehearing still pending, in January 1949 Bradley sought some redress from NYU. For more than six months now he had been suspended, his salary stopped and his public voice silenced. The assumption on which his suspension was made -that he would be in jail by the end of summer 1948 -proved to be false. In fact he did not expect to go to prison. 67 At the least, because the Supreme Court had decided to first review the Hollywood Ten case, "the probability is that there will be no final disposition of my appeal for another year". Events proved him correct. Bradley was still "unclear" why he had been suspended in the first place". Indeed, To suspend a man without a [university] hearing for taking a stand which may yet be decided by the Supreme Court to be in proper defiance of an unconstitutional agency of the government, is not only unfair but a serious breach of the academic freedom in which we both believe.
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The Chancellor sent copies of Bradley"s letter to both Pollock and Voorhis. Their responses were strikingly different. The Dean could see Bradley"s point. To continue indefinitely with Bradley"s suspension would, he argued, do two things. First, because of the false premises on which the decision was based, it would place the University in an "awkward legal and moral situation". Second, it would enable Bradley to "keep the offensive" with the very real probability of him "swaying public 
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Pollock"s recommendation but also sought Bradley"s "elimination from our midst". Personal animosity merged with political ideology. Voorhis continued, he is manifestly a bad egg and will continue, particularly if whitewashed, to give us trouble. I don"t see that leave of absence for the duration at full salary is other than a measure of condonation … Besides it will give comfort and encouragement to other fellow travelers in our camp who are already a distinct menace. 78 According to Professor Arad Riggs, who (as we shall see) served as Pollock"s legal counsel at an internal NYU hearing, "I don"t want to talk too much about it, but I might say that I had a conversation with the United States District Attorney and I am told that when they had this group of eleven serving in the Washington jail, they were afraid they might take Having served his sentence, Bradley assumed that he would be reinstated to his teaching position by NYU. Soon after his release from jail, Bradley wrote to Chancellor Chase requesting the internal hearing promised him on 21 June 1948 in the letter of suspension. 81 From Bradley"s perspective, such a hearing would enable him to state his case; but from the University administration"s perspective, it would be the mechanism, to use Voorhis"s striking phrase, for his "elimination from our midst". NYU was not caught flat-footed by Bradley"s request. In fact, on the day after Bradley went to jail, Harold Voorhis had decided that, because Bradley"s "future usefulness to us is so obviously impaired", there was no need to wait for a hearing and his dismissal should be backdated to 29 May, the day of the Supreme Court decision. 82 Pollock was less rash. The day before, he penned a dense five-page letter to Chase concerning policies and procedures that should be "carefully considered" well before Bradley"s release. For example, given that no charges had been brought against Bradley, would this occur when Bradley was given the opportunity to state his case?
If so, "these charges should be very carefully prepared from the point of view both of the legal aspects of the case and of public relations". And if so, who would prepare and present these charges? 83 The last question may have been rhetorical. It was Pollock who picked up the gauntlet. 
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Judging by the specificity of detail, the number of consultations with legal counsel, the amount of correspondence he conducted, and the length of the report, it must have preoccupied him for much of the summer break and beyond.
84
On 23 October 1950 Pollock dispatched his 33-page report to Chase. There was little evidence of his earlier empathy. 85 He concluded that Bradley"s actions, primarily his deliberate and willful refusal to "recognize the authority of the Congress of the United States", were "adequate cause for terminating his services". 86 A week later, Pollock had crystallised his long report into three specific charges. Bradley was unfit to teach at NYU because "he had been convicted of a crime, to wit, contempt of Congress", because he had made "deliberate falsehoods" to the faculty and students, and because on 11 October 1948, he "participated in and was responsible for an impetuous, improper, and potentially disorderly demonstration". 87 Developments now moved quickly. In preparation for Heald at the end of 1952. In July 1956, under the incoming Carroll V. Newson, the title "Chancellor" was changed to "President".
27
Professor, disputed Pollock"s judgment that the meeting was disorderly and argued that Bradley was not responsible for it but merely assumed responsibility "out of the bigness of his heart". According to 95 In fact, Bradley was never a member of the Communist Party, despite the sustained efforts by FBI agents over many years to prove otherwise. In 1946 the New York office was instructed to "obtain admissible evidence which will prove directly or circumstantially his membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party". The FBI obtained and painstakingly recorded evidence of (seemingly) every petition he signed, every magazine to which he subscribed, every public meeting he attended or public lectures he gave, every organisation he sponsored or supported, every job applicant for whom he wrote a reference -hence the thickness of his file. However, by 1951 the FBI acknowledged that it had found no proof that Bradley was a "card-carrying" communist and his name was deleted from the so-called "Key Figure" list. University he wanted to clean up the campus as much as possible and he has the opportunity now in view of the fact that the University"s budget will be down next year due to less enrollments because of the draft situation and that some of the courses will have to be dropped and this gave him the opportunity of cutting off the staff any professors who might be of a suspicious or subversive category. He stated that if there was anything the Bureau could do whatsoever in the way of furnishing him [leads] personally not at the University but at his office at the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company … they would be the basis for him to take any action that might be needed to clean up the school…[H]e did want the Director to know that he would appreciate any guidance that we could give to him on a personal and strictly confidential basis.
The memorandum concluded with the recommendation that the FBI"s New York Office and Security Division determine which members of staff at NYU were either members of the Communist Party or "security index subjects" and that Agent Scheidt "personally contact" the Chancellor and pass on to him "such data which could then be the basis of an independent investigation" of communist activity at NYU. 96 he said, and more in "the cause of academic freedom". 98 He argued that the judgment of whether or not Bradley was fit to teach had nothing to do with his political opinions. Yet, he alleged, throughout the three days of the Senate Committee"s hearing, "over my repeated remonstrations and objections, evidence after evidence, document after document, was presented, incorporated into the record, which were relevant to nothing but the political ideas of Professor Bradley". If Dean Pollock wished to charge that Bradley was unfit to teach because had associated with communists, "I will defend
Bradley but I want another hearing. The one thing we don"t do in this country is to charge a man with one crime and convict him with another". What Bradley had done was to exercise the right of every American citizen to challenge the validity of government action "which he deemed venal and evil". 
